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ABSTRACT: Ever since Justice Holmes famously asserted that “the Constitution does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” academics have denied that the
Constitution is libertarian. In this essay, I explain that the Constitution is libertarian
to the extent that its original meaning respects and protects the five fundamental
rights that are at the core of both classical liberalism and modern libertarianism.
These rights can be protected both directly by judicial decisions and indirectly by
structural constraints. While the original Constitution and Bill of Rights provided
both forms of constraints, primarily on federal power, it left states free to violate the
liberties of the people—and even enslave their own people—subject only to their own
constitutions. The constitutional protection of individual liberty was substantially
enhanced by adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which
abolished slavery and extended the power of the federal courts and Congress to
protect the rights if individuals from violation by state governments. Libertarianism
has much less to say about either the conduct of foreign policy or the proper
institutional allocation of foreign policy powers (though some libertarians
mistakenly accord to foreign states a sovereignty that properly belongs only to
individuals). Perhaps not coincidentally, the Constitution provides few constraints
on the foreign policy decisions of the political branches, or on the allocation of
power between them.

IS THE CONSTITUTION LIBERTARIAN?
Randy E. Barnett*
I am honored to be delivering the 7th Annual B. Kenneth Simon Lecture. I
have been philosophically close to the Cato Institute since its founding. And one of
the fringe benefits of moving to the Georgetown University Law Center is that now
I am physically close to Cato as well. As a public policy shop, the work of Cato
touched only tangentially on my own scholarship. But ever since the establishment
of its Center for Constitutional Studies, under the extraordinary leadership of my old
friend Roger Pilon, I have enjoyed a much closer relationship to Cato than ever
before. That I might be invited to deliver the prestigious Simon Lecture is, for me,
a wonderful validation of a beautiful friendship.
In this address, I want to address a topic that goes to to the heart of the
mission of the Cato Institute and its Center for Constitutional Studies: Is the
Constitution Libertarian?
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Libertarians and the Constitution: A Love-Hate Relationship
Truth be told, libertarians have a love-hate relationship with the Constitution.
On the one hand libertarians, like most Americans, revere the Constitution.
Libertarians particularly appreciate its express guarantees of individual liberty and
its mechanisms to preserve limited government. If being American is to subscribe
to a creed, then the Constitution, along with the Declaration of Independence, are the
foundational statements of this creed. It is no coincidence, then, that the Cato
Institute is famous for distributing thousands of copies of its little red books
containing the Declaration and Constitution so that the public, both here and abroad,
might read and appreciate the actual words of these singular texts.
But some libertarians have issues with the Constitution as well. And here I
speak for myself, as well as others. There was a reason I eschewed writing about and
teaching Constitutional Law when I became a law professor in favor of teaching
Contracts. For, after taking Constitutional Law in law school, I considered the
Constitution an experiment in limiting the powers of government that, however
noble, had largely failed. Every time we got to one of the “good parts” of the text,
we then read a Supreme Court opinion that explained why it did not really mean what
it appeared to mean.
Nor was only one branch of the government to blame. The judicial passivism
of the Supreme Court has combined with activism by both Congress and Presidents
to produce the behemoth federal and state governments that seem to render the actual
Constitution a mere relic, rather than the governing document it purports to be. This
fundamental failure of the Constitution to limit the size and scope of government has
even led some libertarians to contend that the enactment of the Constitution
represented a coup d’état by big government Federalists against the more preferable
regime defined by the Articles of Confederation and favored by the Antifederalists.
Yet libertarians are genuinely torn, one might go so far as to say
schizophrenic, about how the Constitution has actually worked out. Big and intrusive
as government is today, it could be much worse. Few can point to other countries
where individuals are freer in practice than in the U.S. Many libertarians might be
willing to move there, if such a place existed; yet no such exodus has occurred. And
in important respects, life as an American feels freer than it once did. We seem to
have more choices than ever before, and are freer to live the sorts of lives we wish.
Libertarians still refer to the U.S. as a “free country,” maybe still the freest on earth,
even as the Cato Institute documents the many ways in which our freedoms are
unnecessarily restricted. That the Constitution deserves at least some of the credit
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for this freedom seems likely.
So is the Constitution libertarian or not? It turns out that this is not an easy
question to answer.
What I Mean by “Libertarian”
For one thing, we need to settle on what is meant by “libertarian.” The most
obvious meaning of “libertarian” is a belief in or commitment to individual liberty.
In my experience, the world is divided between Lockeans and Hobbesians. Between
those for whom individual liberty is their first principle of social ordering, and those
who give priority to the need for government power to provide social order and
pursue social ends. Yet most Americans, like Locke himself, harbor a belief in both
individual liberty and the need for government power to accomplish some ends they
believe are important.
However, a general sympathy for individual liberty shared by most Americans
should be distinguished from the modern political philosophy known as
“libertarianism.” A libertarian, in this sense, favors the rigorous protection of certain
individual rights that define the space within which people are free to choose how to
act. These fundamental rights consist of (1) the right of private property, which
includes the property one has in one’s own person; (2) the right of freedom of
contract by which rights are transferred by one person to another; (3) the right of first
possession, by which property comes to be owned from an unowned state; (4) the
right to defend oneself and others when fundamental rights are being threatened; and
(5) the right to restitution or compensation from those who violate another’s
fundamental rights.1
If modern libertarianism is defined by the commitment to these rights, it is not
defined by the justifications for this commitment. Some libertarians are
consequentialists, others are deontologists, while still others adopt a compatablist
approach that straddles the line between moral and consequentialist justifications. It
is useful to emphasize that libertarianism is not a moral philosophy; it is a political
philosophy that rests upon certain moral conclusions that can be supported in a

1

See R AN D Y E. B ARN ETT , T H E S TRU CTU RE O F L IB ERTY : J USTIC E AND THE R U LE O F L AW
(1998) (explaining how these five fundamental rights solve the pervasive social problems of
knowledge, interest and power).
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variety of ways.2
Modern libertarianism can be viewed as a subset of classical liberalism, in the
following way. All classical liberals believe in respecting and protecting these five
rights, which distinguishes classical liberals from others who would deny some or all
of these rights. Yet some classical liberals might add other rights to this list—such
as an enforceable right to some minimum level of material support—or might
sometimes favor limiting the scope of these fundamental rights to achieve other
important social objectives.
In contrast, modern libertarians are distinctive for their tendency to limit the
set of fundamental rights to these five, and their reluctance ever to restrict the
exercise of these rights to achieve other worthy objectives. They view these rights
as “side-constraints”3 on the pursuit of any personal and collective ends. Their
working thesis is that all genuinely desirable social objectives can be achieved by
respecting these rights. The more rigorously, the better. In my talk, I will consider
the degree to which the Constitution is “libertarian” insofar as it respects and protects
the fundamental rights to which modern libertarians and classical liberals generally
adhere.
Holmes’s Denial That the Constitution is Libertarian
Now for some, asking whether the Constitution is libertarian in either the
classical liberal or modern sense may seem completely inappropriate. In one of the
most famous lines in any Supreme Court opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., in his dissent in the 1905 case of Lochner v. New York4 proclaimed that “The
Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”5 Because modern
academics know so little about Spencer, and what they think they know is a
distortion, Holmes’s exact meaning here is not always appreciated. Holmes was not
rejecting the so-called Social Darwinism that has been falsely associated with

2

See Randy E. Barnett, The Moral Foundations of Modern Libertarianism, in V ARIETIES OF
C O N SERVATISM IN A M ERICA (Peter Berkowitz, ed. 2004), p. 51.
3

The term “side constraints” was coined by Robert Nozick. See R O BERT N O ZIC K , A N ARCH Y ,
S TATE , AN D U TO PIA 33-35 (1974).
4

198 U. S. 45 (1905).

5

Id at 75 (Holmes, J. dissenting).

RANDY E. BARNETT

IS THE CONSTITUTION LIBERTARIAN?

PAGE 5

Spencer. Holmes himself was a social Darwinist, as were most political Progressives
of his day.
No, Holmes was referring to Spencer’s “Law of Equal Freedom” the principle
made so famous by Spencer that Holmes could be confident that his readers would
not miss his reference. In Social Statics, Spencer affirmed “that every man may claim
the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the possession of like
liberty to every other man.”6 Or, in another formulation, each “has freedom to do all
that he wills provided that he infringes not the equal freedom of any other.”7 That
this was Holmes’ target was made clear just before his reference to Spencer when he
referred to: “The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not
interfere with the liberty of others to do the same,” which Holmes dismissed as “a
shibboleth for some well-known writers.”8
Holmes took on Spencer in this way because the majority opinion in Lochner
came as close as the Supreme Court ever has to protecting a general right to liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Rufus
Peckham affirmed that the Constitution protected “the right of the individual to his
personal liberty, or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem
to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family.”9 For this
reason, ever since law school, Peckham’s opinion in Lochner has been my favorite
majority opinion in any Supreme Court case. (Justice Scalia’s opinion in District of
Columbia v. Heller10 has recently become number two!)
Holmes’s pithy dissent offered two influential arguments against recognizing
a general constitutional right to liberty. First, he claimed that Supreme Court
precedents were inconsistent with a general right to liberty. Liberty, he wrote, “is
interfered with by school laws, by the Postoffice, by every state or municipal
institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes
it or not.” And any constitutional right to freedom of contract was belied by previous

6

H ERBERT S PEN CER , S O CIA L S TATIC S : O R , T H E C ON D ITIO N S
F IR ST O F TH EM D EVELO PED 239 (1851).

SPECIFIED , AN D TH E
7

Id. at 337.

8

198 U. S., at 75.

9

Id at 56 (Peckham, J.)

10

554 U.S. ___ (2008).

ESSEN TIA L TO

H APPIN ESS
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decisions upholding vaccination laws, maximum hours laws for miners, and
prohibitions on “combinations,” the sale of stock on margins, or for future delivery.
Second, apart from precedent, Holmes offered a claim about the
Constitution’s meaning. “[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory,” he contended, “whether of paternalism and the organic relation of
the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”11 Rather, in Holmes’s view, the
Constitution “is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident
of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking,
ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying
them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.”12
Both of these objections to a constitutional right to liberty have become
deeply embedded in constitutional discourse. For example, the first of Holmes’s
arguments was echoed by Ronald Dworkin in his book Taking Rights Seriously.13
Dworkin denied there was a general right to liberty on the ground that no one has a
“political right to drive up Lexington Avenue” (which is a one-way street running
downtown, not uptown).14 Holmes’s second argument was echoed by John Rawls
in Political Liberalism, when Rawls contended that, because of “the fact of
reasonable pluralism,”15 a constitution was best conceived as a second-order process
for handling political disagreement in a pluralist society rather than dictating a first
order answer to political disagreements.
Yet neither objection is compelling. Holmes contended that previous
decisions accepting restrictions on liberty refute the existence of a constitutional right
to liberty, but this does not follow. For one thing, prior decisions may have been
mistaken to uphold these restrictions on liberty. Even if correct, however, such
decisions do not refute the existence of a right to liberty. Instead, they could simply
be “exceptions.” An exception presupposes the existence of a general rule (to which
it is the exception).

11

Id. at 75 (Holmes, J. dissenting).

12

Id. at 76.

13

See Ronald Dworkin, What Rights Do We Have?, in T AKIN G R IG H TS S ERIO U SLY 266-272
(discussing why there is “no right to liberty”).
14

Id. at 269.

15

J OH N R AW LS , P O LITIC AL L IB ERALISM 36 (1996).

RANDY E. BARNETT

IS THE CONSTITUTION LIBERTARIAN?

PAGE 7

Law professors have long derided what they call “slippery slope” arguments.16
This is an objection to a particular law or ruling because it makes more likely an even
more objectionable law or ruling in the future. Once you take a single step on a
slippery slope, you are likely to slide all the way down. Restricting liberty in one
case is likely to lead to other restrictions down the road. Law professors respond that
the law makes distinctions all the time and each decision should be made on its own
merits. If you don’t want to go farther in a future situation, then that is the time to
make one’s objection.
The wide acceptance of Holmes’s use of exceptions to deny the existence of
a rule, however, supports skepticism about the feasibility of making exceptions in a
common law system in which any exception is thereafter transformed into a
precedent for more of the same. Assuming the Constitution really does protect a
general right to liberty, as the majority in Lochner appear to have believed, perhaps
it was a mistake to recognize any of the exceptions on which Holmes’s rested his
argument. On the other hand, how can the existence of all these approved constraints
on liberty be consistent with a general right of liberty? Perhaps Holmes is correct
that the existence of so-called exceptions is evidence that the purported rule is
unsound. At a minimum, they would seem to be precedent for upholding further
restrictions on liberty.
Holmes’s argument assumes that a constitutional right to liberty must be
absolute to be a right. If, however, a right to liberty is viewed as presumptive rather
than absolute, then the existence of “exceptions” is not a bug, it is a feature. Take,
for example, the freedom of speech. In practice, this right is presumptive rather than
absolute. No one thinks that the constitutionality of “time, place, and manner”
regulations of speech refutes the existence of the right. Holmes himself repeatedly
asserted a general right to freedom of speech, notwithstanding his opinion that no one
has a right to falsely shout fire in a crowded theater.17 That freedom of speech is a
constitutional right places the burden on the government to justify its restriction as
necessary and proper. It may not burden speech merely because it thinks it is a nifty
idea. A court must pass upon its necessity.
Likewise, if a general right to liberty is conceived as a “Presumption of
16

See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 H ARV . L. R EV . 117 (2003)
(examining the logic of and defending slippery slope arguments from critics).
17

See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a
panic.”).
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Liberty,”18 this does not automatically render all restrictions on actions
unconstitutional. It merely means that, as with speech, any restriction on other types
of conduct must be justified. The type of justification will vary depending on
whether a law is a prohibition of wrongful conduct or a regulation of rightful
conduct.
Prohibiting wrongful conduct is perfectly consistent with a right to liberty.
By “wrongful,” I mean conduct that violates the rights of others.19 As Spencer’s Law
of Equal Freedom maintains, no one has the rightful liberty to violate the equal rights
of others. The prohibition of wrongful acts constitutes a protection of the rightful
liberty of others, rather than an infringement on the liberty of the wrongdoer. One
has no right to do wrong to another.
Nor are all legal regulations of rightful conduct inconsistent with a general
right to liberty. A “regulation” is a law that specifies how a liberty may be exercised.
It takes the form, “If you want to do X—make a contract, carry a gun, drive a
car—then here is how you do it.” Legal regulations are consistent with liberty
because the fundamental rights that define liberty are too abstract to be applied
directly to all but the simplest of cases. For example, what constitutes a sufficient
provocation to justify self-defense? What constitutes consent to a contract? How do
we measure damages for breaches of contracts or torts? Rules of law are needed to
answer these and countless other such questions. As Locke observed, in the state of
nature: “There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by
common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to
decide all controversies between them. . . .”20
Whether a particular regulation is consistent with liberty depends on the
justification offered on its behalf. Regulations are not inimical to liberty if they
coordinate individual conduct as do, for example, traffic regulations mandating
driving on one side of the street or the other. They may also be consistent with
liberty if they prevent irreparable tortious accidents before they occur, as speed limits
do. True, you could sue someone for negligently driving too fast after he crashes into
you, but given the bodily harm caused by an accident, it might be better to reduce
18

OF

See generally R ANDY E. B ARNETT , R ESTORING THE L OST C ONSTITU TIO N : T H E P RESU M PTIO N
L IB ERTY (2004)
19

As I am using the term, “wrongful” or unjust conduct that violates the rights of others is a
subset of “bad” or immoral conduct that may or may not be rights violating.
20

J OH N L OCKE , S ECO N D T REATISE O F G O VERN M EN T , ch. IX, §124.

RANDY E. BARNETT

IS THE CONSTITUTION LIBERTARIAN?

PAGE 9

incidents of negligence by specifying in advance how fast one should drive on a
particular stretch of road. Although many libertarians object to government
ownership of highways, no libertarian objects in principle to a highway owner
regulating its use to enhance the speed and safety of driving. Similarly, contract law
is a body of rules regulating the making and enforcing of agreements, and libertarians
are not opposed to contract law.
For libertarians, the issue is often not whether conduct should be regulated
but who should regulate, the government or property owners? Property owners
typically have greater incentives for more efficient regulations than government.
And, even where this is not the case, the fact that governments typically exert
ownership powers over all the streets, sidewalks, and parks in a given territory makes
their regulatory powers far more susceptible to abuse.
A law restricting conduct is consistent with a right to liberty, therefore, if it
is prohibiting wrongful acts that violate the rights of others or regulating rightful acts
in such a way as to coordinate conduct or prevent the violation of rights that might
accidentally occur. A law is inconsistent with liberty if it is either prohibiting rightful
acts, or regulating unnecessarily or improperly. A regulation is improper when it
imposes an undue burden on rightful conduct, or when its justification is merely a
pretext for restricting a liberty of which others disapprove. And one way of
identifying a regulation as pretextual is to assess whether the regulatory means it
employs do not effectively fit its purported health and safety ends.
Here is how the majority in Lochner distinguished a constitutional exercise
of the police power from an unconstitutional restraint on liberty:
In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of this
character is concerned, and where the protection of the Federal Constitution is
sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate
exercise of the police power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and
arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or to
enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate
21
or necessary for the support of himself and his family?

We may conclude from all this that, if a general right to liberty is
presumptive, not absolute, and if the presumption may be rebutted by a showing that
a law is prohibiting wrongful or properly regulating rightful acts, then the fact that
regulations of liberty have been upheld as constitutional is no evidence that the

21

198 U. S. at 56 (Peckham, J.).

RANDY E. BARNETT

IS THE CONSTITUTION LIBERTARIAN?

PAGE 10

general constitutional right to liberty does not exist. It may merely be a sign that the
government has met its properly-defined burden of proof.
But does the Constitution protect a general right to liberty of this type? This
brings us to the second of Holmes’s objections: That the Constitution does not
“embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”22 Or the modern version of this
argument that the Constitution establishes second-order decision mechanisms by
which first order political disagreements are hashed out. In Lochner, who was right
about the Constitution, the majority or Holmes? The answer depends on what the
Constitution means, and to figure this out requires a method of constitutional
interpretation.
Originalism and Liberty
As a political philosophy, libertarianism does not specify how the
Constitution should be interpreted. Should a libertarian simply favor any
interpretation of the text that enhances liberty? I think not. The Constitution is the
law that governs those who govern us. That those who govern may be restrained in
the exercise of their power, it was put in writing. As John Marshall explained in
Marbury v. Madison, “powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”23 A
written constitution performs this restraining function because it has a semantic
meaning that is independent of the desires of those who are called to interpret it.
This implication of a written constitution was clearly identified by Lysander
Spooner, one of America’s earliest constitutional theorists. In his 1847 book, The
Unconstitutionality of Slavery, Spooner observed:
[T]he constitution, of itself, independently of the actual intentions of the people,
expresses some certain fixed, definite, and legal intentions; else the people
themselves would express no intentions by agreeing to it. The instrument would, in
fact, contain nothing that the people could agree to. Agreeing to an instrument that

22

Id. at 75 (Holmes, J. dissenting).

23

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.)
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had no meaning of its own, would only be agreeing to nothing.24

In other words, the meaning of a written constitution is the semantic meaning
of its words in context.25 We adopt a written constitution because it has a semantic
meaning that defines the limits of the powers of those who govern, and thereby helps
keep these powers within proper bounds. And we adhere to the semantic meaning
at the time of enactment because a written constitution would fail to perform its
purpose if legislatures, executives or courts could, whether alone or in combination,
alter the meaning of these constraints on their powers.26 The name we use today to
describe this approach to constitutional interpretation is “original public meaning
originalism,” or “originalism” for short. An originalist is simply a person who
believes that the semantic meaning of the Constitution must be followed until it is
properly changed.
But there is a limit to the guidance provided by the original public meaning
of the Constitution. Often the text is specific enough to be applied directly to most
controversies it was meant to govern. For example, each state is to have two
senators, and the President is to be thirty five years of age. These are the provisions
of the Constitution that are not usually disputed or litigated. But other provisions of
the text are more general or vague.
The Eighth Amendment bans “cruel and unusual”27 punishments not specific
types of punishment; it also bans “excessive”28 bail and fines, not a specific sum of
money. The Fourth Amendment bans “unreasonable”29 searches and seizures, and

24

L Y SAN D ER S PO O N ER , T HE U N CON STITUTIO N ALITY O F S LAVERY 222 (rev. ed 1860). Part I
of this work was published 1845. The quoted passage comes from Part II, which first appeared in
1847.
25

See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, (July 2, 2008), Illinois Public Law Research
Paper No. 07-24. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
26

See B ARN ETT , supra note 18, at 89-117.

27

U.S. C O N ST . amend. VIII.

28

Id.

29

U.S. C O N ST . amend. IV.
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the “due” process of law.30 Even
seemingly more specific provisions, such as the prohibition on laws “abridging the
freedom of speech”31 require further specification of what constitutes “speech” given
changing technology and what constitutes an “abridgment.”
That the original meaning of provisions like these are vague does not mean
that they provide no guidance at all. For one thing there are core or paradigm cases
to which they clearly apply, and peripheral cases to which they clearly do not. A text
is vague when it is unclear whether a borderline case is included in or excluded by
its meaning. In this situation, the original meaning of the text must be supplemented.
Constitutional interpretation is the activity of identifying the original meaning of the
text; constitutional construction is the activity of supplementation when the meaning
is too vague to settle a dispute.32
This does not entail that constitutional construction is an entirely open-ended
affair. A construction of the text that violated the original public meaning would be
improper. You can think of constitutional interpretation as providing a frame within
which choices must be made; but any choices that are outside the frame are
unconstitutional.
Let me illustrate this by the Second Amendment, the original public meaning
of which, the Court in Heller correctly found to protect an individual right.33 Given
that the DC statute prohibited the exercise of this right, it was a paradigm case of a
statute that “infringed” the “right of the people to keep an bear arms.”34 But what
about laws that regulate rather than prohibit the exercise of this right. Suppose a law
allows the concealed carrying of a firearm, but only by those adults who take an
approved firearms safety course? Is this regulation reasonable? Because whatever
answer to this question is given will not be deduced directly from the original
30

U.S. C O N ST . amend. V & XIV.

31

U.S. C O N ST . amend. I.

32

See B ARN ETT , supra note 18, at 118-130. Constitutional construction is also needed when
the original meaning of the text is irreducibly ambiguous in the sense that its words in context have
multiple meanings and evidence is insufficient to establish a unique original semantic meaning. See
Solum, supra note 21; Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional
Assumptions, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 615 (2009).
33

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___ (2008).

34

U.S. C O N ST . amend. II.
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meaning of the Second Amendment, it would require a construction of the
Constitution in addition to an interpretation.
How constitutional construction should be done is a bigger issue than I can
address here, so let me simply summarize the conclusion I defend in Restoring the
Lost Constitution: constitutional construction should be done in such a manner as to
enhance the legitimacy of the Constitution.35 By “legitimacy” I mean whatever
quality makes the Constitution binding. How people construe vagueness in the text
will often depend on what they believe makes the Constitution legitimate.
Some believe that the legitimacy of the Constitution rests on the original
consent of the people. Others think its legitimacy rests on the consent of the people
today. I agree with Lysander Spooner that both original and contemporary consent
is a fiction.36 Laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution are imposed on those who
do not consent to it, every bit as much as they are applied to those who do. A
constitution is legitimate, therefore, only if it provides adequate assurances that the
laws it imposes on nonconsenting persons do not violate their rights and are
necessary to protect the rights of others. When the text is too vague to resolve a
dispute, the text should be construed to ensure that the rights retained by the people
are not being denied or disparaged.
What the Constitution Says
With this analysis in mind, we are now in a position to refine the question, “Is
the Constitution Libertarian?” to this: “Does the original meaning of the Constitution,
as amended, respect and protect the fundamental individual rights that define the core
of both classical liberalism and modern libertarianism?” To assess this, we must now
briefly examine the original meaning of what the Constitution says and how it may
fairly be construed.
Except for the prohibition of involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Constitution does not apply directly to the people. Instead it creates
a process by which laws are made, applied and enforced. So when asking whether
the Constitution is “libertarian,” we are really asking whether the laws that are
applied to and enforced against particular persons pursuant to the Constitution

35

36

See B ARN ETT , supra note 18, at 32-52, 125-28.

See id. at 11-31; L Y SAN D ER S POO N ER , N O T REASO N VI: T HE C O N STITUTIO N
A U TH O RITY (1870).
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NO

RANDY E. BARNETT

IS THE CONSTITUTION LIBERTARIAN?

PAGE 14

respect their fundamental rights.
The Original Constitution. The original Constitution protected the rights to
life, liberty, and property against infringement by the federal government in two
ways. First and foremost, Congress was not given a general legislative power but
only those legislative powers “herein granted,”37 referring to those powers
enumerated in Article I, section 8. It is striking how these powers avoid expressly
restricting the rightful exercise of liberty. The power “to raise and support armies”38
does not include an express power of conscription, which would interfere with the
property one has in one’s own person. The power to establish the post office does
not expressly claim a power to make the government post office a monopoly,39 which
would interfere with the freedom of contract of those who wish to contract with a
private mail company of the sort founded by Lysander Spooner. (By contrast, the
Articles of Confederation did accord the power in Congress to establish a postal
monopoly.40)
There are only three powers that might be construed as restricting the rightful
exercise of liberty. First is the Necessary and Proper Clause granting Congress the
power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution”41 its other powers. Even here, a law must not only be necessary, it must
also be proper, which suggests that a law that violates the rights retained by the
people might well be improper.
Second, is the power of Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, by granting for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
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Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”42 Libertarians are divided about
whether granting patents or copyrights to some violates the rights of others. But even
this provision does not mandate the creation of a patent or copyright system; it
merely allows Congress to do so if it chooses.
Finally, I leave aside the question of whether the power “to lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”43 is a violation of fundamental rights. This is
a more complex issue than I can tackle here. Whether or not a general tax violates
the fundamental right to property, however, it does not restrict liberty in the same
way that a prohibition or regulation does. Compare the impact of conscription on a
person’s liberty as compared with imposing a tax to pay others to enlist in the
military.
Of course, the Supreme Court has upheld countless federal laws restricting
liberty, primarily under the power of Congress “to regulate commerce . . . among the
several states”44 combined with an open-ended reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Further it has upheld the power of Congress to spend tax revenue for
purposes other than “for carrying into execution” its enumerated powers, thereby
exceeding the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This shows only that, with
respect to federal power, the text of the original Constitution is far more libertarian
than the redacted constitution enforced by the Supreme Court. But the original
Constitution is not all we have.
The Amendments to the Constitution. Two years after its enactment, the
Constitution was amended by the Bill of Rights. These ten amendments included
several express guarantees of such liberties as the freedom of speech, press,
assembly, and the right to keep and bear arms. The Bill of Rights barred takings for
public use without just compensation. It provided additional procedural assurances
that the laws would be applied accurately and fairly to particular individuals.
All of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are consistent with modern
libertarian political philosophy. And to this list of rights was added the Ninth
Amendment that said, “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”45 In this way, even
42
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liberty rights that were not listed were given express constitutional protection.46
Finally, the Tenth Amendment reaffirmed that Congress could exercise only those
powers to which it was delegated “by this Constitution.”47
Despite the efforts of James Madison, the first ten amendments only restricted
federal power—or so the Supreme Court held in Barron v. Baltimore.48 States
retained their virtually unlimited powers to restrict the liberties of their residents,
subject only to their own constitutions as interpreted by their own courts. And the
Eleventh Amendment further expanded state powers by rendering them immune from
suits in federal court by citizens of other states.49
Article I, §9 of the original Constitution placed some restrictions on the
power of state governments, but these constraints were few. So great were their
reserved powers, states were widely thought to have the power to sanction the
enslavement of some persons within their jurisdiction. And, unless one accepts the
interpretive claims of such abolitionists as Lysander Spooner, William Goodell,
Gerrit Smith, Joel Tiffany and Frederick Douglass, the original Constitution also
protected slavery by mandating the return of runaway slaves who managed to escape
to free states. Because it allowed states to violate the rights of their citizens with near
impunity, the original Constitution was deeply flawed from a libertarian perspective.
Fortunately, it has been amended in ways that made it more libertarian.
While the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude expanded
the Constitution’s protection of individual liberty against abuses by states,50 it was
the Fourteenth Amendment that radically altered the federalism of the original
Constitution. For the first time, Congress and the courts could invalidate any state
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laws that “abridge[d] the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”51
The original meaning of “privileges or immunities” included the same natural rights
retained by the people to which the Ninth Amendment referred, but also the
additional enumerated rights contained in the Bill of Rights.52 The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment53 placed a federal check on how state laws are
applied to particular persons, while the Equal Protection Clause54 imposed a duty on
state executive branches to extend the protection of the law on all persons without
discrimination.
Although some libertarians are uncomfortable what they view as a weakening
of states rights, the Fourteenth Amendment only expanded the power of the Congress
and courts to protect against state infringements of individual rights. Libertarians
might well favor some mechanism by which state courts could protect individual
rights from federal infringements. Still, the federal government’s power to combat
what Clint Bolick has called “grassroots tyranny”55 represented a significant
enhancement of the protection of individual liberty afforded by the Constitution.
When the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
combined with the Ninth, the unenumerated liberty rights retained by the people were
expressly protected against infringement by both federal and state governments.
But constitutional construction is required to put these protections of liberty
into effect. Beginning in the 1930s,56 the Supreme Court reversed its approach in
Lochner and adopted a presumption of constitutionality whenever a statute restricted
unenumerated liberty rights. In the 1950s it made this presumption effectively
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irrebuttable.57 Now it will only protect those liberties that are listed, or a very few
unenumerated rights such as the right of privacy. But such an approach violates the
Ninth Amendment’s injunction against using the fact that some rights are enumerated
to deny or disparage others because they are not.58 Like the presumption of
constitutionality, a Presumption of Liberty that places the burden on the government
to show that its restriction on any liberty is both necessary and proper is also a
constitutional construction. Neither is mentioned in the text. But a Presumption of
Liberty is far more compatible with the original meaning of what the Constitution
does say in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Of course, the protection of liberty afforded by the Constitution is not limited
to the protection of liberty rights by courts. It includes as well the “checks and
balances” provided by the separation of powers at the federal level and the division
of powers between the national and state governments. In addition, the Constitution
contains popular checks on legislative and executive power. These included the
power of the electorate to remove legislators and presidents from office during
regular elections, and eventually term limits for the President. The constitutional
guarantee of a jury trial originally included not only the power of citizen juries to
pass upon both the facts of case to acquit the innocent, but also the power to refuse
to convict persons charged with violating unjust laws.59
It is worth noting that none of these structural and procedural protections is
dictated by libertarian political philosophy. All are to be assessed pragmatically by
whether, on balance, they serve to protect fundamental rights. With the weakening
or loss of other liberty-protecting clauses of the Constitution, these structural
constraints are responsible for preserving the liberty Americans still enjoy.
The Foreign Policy Powers
Some may have noticed that, to this point, I have confined my analysis to the
domestic powers of the federal and state governments to restrict the liberties of the
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people. I have not mentioned, much less analyzed, the foreign policy powers created
by the Constitution. In this final portion of my remarks I want to explain why
libertarianism tells us very little about either the conduct of foreign policy or how the
foreign policy powers of the national government should be allocated among the
different branches. Not coincidentally, perhaps, neither does the original meaning
of the Constitution.
Modern libertarianism is based on the recognition and protection of the five
fundamental human rights of private property, freedom of contract, first possession,
defense of self and others, and restitution. My thesis is that (1) a constitution is
libertarian to the extent it creates a political order that respects and protects these
rights, and (2) the original meaning of the Constitution is far more libertarian than
the redacted version applied by the Supreme Court today. In this sense, the
Constitution should be considered libertarian, at least relative to the status quo.
In the realm of foreign policy, however, the libertarian commitment to these
individual fundamental rights complicates matters in ways that many libertarians do
not appreciate. Some libertarians try to apply the same principles of self-defense and
aggression to states that they apply to individuals. But doing so is a category mistake
that results, ironically, in the reification of nation states in a way that should make
libertarians uncomfortable. In the realm of foreign policy, libertarians need to think
more carefully about the concept of sovereignty.
To reduce the likelihood of religious wars, the Peace of Westphalia in the
Seventeenth Century gave every monarch a “sovereign” control over the lives and
property of all within its territory. Every monarch could establish the religion of his
realm to which all must adhere and no monarch was to interfere with the internal
affairs of any other sovereign, for example, to aid persons being persecuted for their
religious beliefs. In effect, each sovereign monarch became the recognized legal
“owner” of his territory and the people residing thereon, and each sovereign was
obliged to respect the ownership rights of the other sovereign monarchs.
Whatever the practical advantages of this system of nation state sovereignties,
the foundation of the American republic greatly complicated the theory on which it
rested. Lacking a monarch or aristocracy, Americans were skeptical of the very
notion of sovereignty. Consider the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia,60 the
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Supreme Court’s first great constitutional case.61 In Chisholm, the Court rejected the
state of Georgia’s claim of sovereign immunity against a suit for breach of contract,
which had been brought against it in federal court. Justice James Wilson began his
opinion by observing: “To the Constitution of the United States the term
SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown.”62 For Wilson, “[T]here is but one place where
it could have been used with propriety . . . They might have announced themselves
“SOVEREIGN” people of the United States: But serenely conscious of the fact, they
avoided the ostentatious declaration.”63
It is worth noting that, as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention from
Pennsylvania, Wilson—perhaps our most neglected founder—was a member of the
Committee of Detail that produced the first draft of the actual wording of the
Constitution.64 He was also he first professor of law at the University of
Pennsylvania. In his lengthy opinion in Chisholm, Wilson rejected both the feudal
notion of monarchical sovereignty and the Blackstonian notion of parliamentary
sovereignty in favor of the concept of individual sovereignty.
According to Wilson, governments were not sovereigns themselves, but
aggregates of individual sovereigns. “The only reason, I believe, why a free man is
bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself. Upon the same principles, upon
which he becomes bound by the laws, he becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice,
which are formed and authorised by those laws.”65 Wilson then identifies what can
only be called an individualist notion of popular sovereignty. “If one free man, an
original sovereign, may do all this; why may not an aggregate of free men, a
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collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise? If the dignity of each singly is
undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be unimpaired.”66 Likewise, in his
opinion in Chisholm, Chief Justice John Jay referred to “fellow citizens and joint
sovereigns.”67
James Wilson was a forceful proponent of natural rights68 and the notion of
individual sovereignty he articulated in Chisholm is indistinguishable from the
libertarian view that each person is sovereign with respect to what is properly hers
as defined by the five fundamental rights. Like a monarch, within her realm, she may
do or refrain from doing anything with what she rightfully possesses. Any forcible
interference with this individual sovereignty constitutes an aggression that may be
resisted by force if necessary in self-defense. And others may justly come to the
assistance of a person whose rights are being violated.
Indeed, the close relationship between natural rights and individual
sovereignty is reflected in the pairing of the Ninth Amendment’s protection of the
natural “rights . . . retained by the people”69 with the Tenth Amendment’s reservation
of powers not delegated by the federal government to the states “or to the people.”70
While Chisholm concerned the assertion of state sovereign immunity within
a federal system, the libertarian concept of individual sovereignty also complicates
and qualifies the Westphalian notion of unfettered state sovereignty in international
relations. If the people are the true joint sovereigns, then no ruler may justly deprive
them of their inalienable fundamental rights. Since the horrors of the Holocaust, the
Westphalian concept of sovereignty has been qualified in international law by the
recognition of “human rights” that no state may violate—though it is far from clear
when one state, or group of states, may intervene to protect these rights.
Individual-empowering technology has also undermined the neat Westphalian
picture of sovereign nation states with the power to control what takes place with
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their borders. Transnational globalization is the liberating upside of empowered
individuals; the newfound power of nongovernmental terrorist organizations to wage
wars against the populations of nation states is the downside
This erosion of the Westphalian nation state system requires new and more
careful theoretical analysis by libertarians. The first instincts of collectivists has been
to create and empower international organizations that resemble governments writ
large. For them, the New World Order requires one world government. Libertarians
know this is a bad idea, but they have yet to develop their own coherent approach to
the protection of individual rights from abuses by nation states.
Libertarians need to look beyond the Westphalian system of sovereignty, and
explore how existing governments and their militaries might evolve within a
polycentric regime of competitive private ordering that arises spontaneously across
national boundaries. In both the domestic and international spheres, the respect for
and protection of individual sovereignty defined by the fundamental rights of all
persons provides the ends against which the performance of government can be
assessed.
The foreign policy of noninterventionism to which the Cato Institute is
committed is, by and large, the most workable approach to the preservation of the
liberties enjoyed by Americans and the avoidance of the unanticipated consequences
of initiating or provoking foreign wars. But a policy of nonintervention should not
be equated with the fundamental human rights that define modern libertarianism. It
is a policy that must be evaluated pragmatically, and one in which exceptions are
sometimes warranted, for example when the protection of the rights of Americans is
best served by protecting the individual sovereignty of foreigners.
By no means am I proposing that any single nation state, such as the United
States, should take it upon itself to go to the rescue of all those whose fundamental
rights are being systematically violated by their own governments. I am merely
noting that a nation state is not violating libertarian fundamental rights when, for
reasons of its own national interest, it protects those whose individual sovereignty is
being systematically violated by a government who claims jurisdiction over them.
When the French government provided military assistance to the American
revolutionaries, for example, it did so after the Declaration of Independence specified
how the British government had systematically violated the rights of Americans.
That the French government interfered with British “sovereignty” does not, by itself,
entail any transgression of libertarian fundamental rights and individual sovereignty.
In foreign policy matters, the text of the Constitution provides much less
guidance than it does with respect to domestic powers. While the proper scope of the
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domestic powers of the federal government is limited, the scope of its foreign policy
powers is not. While its allocation of domestic powers among the three branches of
government are specified to some degree, its allocation of foreign policy powers is
far more open-ended.
For example, the Constitution says Congress has the power “to declare
War,”71 but the original meaning of this term had a technical sense of altering the
legal relationship of two nations under international law from a state of peace to a
state of war. It did not purport to govern the use of the armed forces of the United
States in response to a “state of war” initiated by the aggression of a foreign power
against Americans, whether at home or abroad. One can declare war without firing
a shot, but when shots are fired a state of war may nevertheless exist even without a
declaration.
The Constitution says that the President is “Commander in Chief”72 of the
armed forces, but does not specify the degree to which his powers can be constrained
by statutes enacted by Congress, which the Constitution says the President has a duty
to “take care”73 are faithfully executed. The Constitution gives Congress the
enumerated power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces”74 but is unclear as to whether these regulations apply to the
President himself, or to the minute details of a military campaign. The Constitution
also empowers Congress “to regulate commerce . . . with foreign nations”75 and
provides procedures to govern the making of Treaties. And only Congress has the
power to commit funds “to raise and support Armies.”76
In short, the text of the Constitution provides little guidance on the proper
separation of powers with respect to the conduct of foreign policy and no guidance
whatsoever on the substance of foreign policy. As wrong as Holmes was to claim a
lack of constitutional constraints on the domestic powers of government, his
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description might well be accurate with respect to the realm of foreign policy. For
better or worse, the Constitution may well be “made for people of fundamentally
differing views”77 about foreign policy, whether these views be interventionist or
noninterventionist. While the domestic powers of the federal government are
constitutionally limited, its foreign policy powers are, for all intents and purposes,
limited only by political mechanisms.
Conclusion
So is the Constitution libertarian? Even with all the caveats and
qualifications, the answer is clear. As written, the original Constitution of the United
States, together with its amendments, may be the most explicitly libertarian
governing document ever actually enacted into law. The Supreme Court says that
only the liberties that are listed in the Bill of Rights, plus a right of privacy, merit
judicial protection.78 But the Constitution says that the enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparate others
retained by the people. The Supreme Court says that the states must respect a mere
handful of liberties. But the Constitution says that no State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.
Why then have these and other parts of the Constitution been excised from
constitutional law? Tempting as it is to blame the Court, the Founders understood
how unrealistic it is to expect judges to withstand majoritarian pressures for very
long. After all, Justices are typically chosen by Presidents from among those who
share the Zeitgeist of their day. The Constitution has been redacted precisely because
its across-the-board protection of liberty stood in the way of the politically popular
growth of government that culminated in the New Deal and the Great Society. Once
grown, these powers are very difficult to pare back even when they become less
popular.
The lost Constitution will only be restored when the constitutional imperative
of individual liberty are as well understood today as they were by those who wrote
the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
All who read these words have a role to play in bettering their own understanding of
individual liberty so they may explain the blessings of liberty to others. The lost
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Constitution will not be restored by erudite legal arguments or clever litigation
strategies until the public’s demand for individual liberty and limited government
produces a President who will appoint faithful originalist justices who believe in the
power of courts to nullify unconstitutional laws and Senators who will confirm them.
And when that day arrives, the libertarian Constitution will be waiting.

